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A B S T R A C T
In the current health care system, high costs without proportional improvements in quality or outcome have
prompted widespread calls for change in how we deliver and pay for care. Value-based health care delivery
models have been proposed. Multiple impediments exist to achieving value, including misaligned patient
and provider incentives, information asymmetries, convoluted and opaque cost structures, and cultural
attitudes toward cancer treatment. Radiation oncology as a specialty has recently become a focus of the
value discussion. Escalating costs secondary to rapidly evolving technologies, safety breaches, and variable,
nonstandardized structures and processes of delivering care have garnered attention. In response, we
present a framework for the value discussion in radiation oncology and identify approaches for attaining
value, including economic and structural models, process improvements, outcome measurement, and
cost assessment.
J Clin Oncol 32:2864-2870. © 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology
“Nowadays people know the price of ev-
erything and the value of nothing.”
—Lord Henry Wotton, from The Picture of
Dorian Gray, Oscar Wilde
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the continued and unsustainable rise
in health care spending in the United States (fast
approaching 20% of GDP)1 without a proportional
rise in quality or improvement in outcomes has
raised critical questions about the inevitable need for
change in our current health care delivery system.
Patients, health care providers, and payers all desire
improvement in health outcomes with simultane-
ous control of rising costs. Transformation to a
value-based health care delivery model is proposed
to address the challenge.2,3 The value proposition in
health care represents an elusive yet highly sought-
after goal for our health care system and for the
specialty of radiation oncology. Herein, we discuss
the meaning of value, the current economic land-
scape and impediments to achieving value, and
some considerations for achieving a value-based
health care delivery model in the future.
VALUE DEFINED
To address the question of how to achieve value in
health care delivery, we must first understand what
value is. In the world outside of medicine, a so-called
good value is a desirable product or service that can
be purchased for a fair price. The definition of value
will vary depending on several factors, including the
social identity and the social context of the person
purchasing the product or service. For instance,
value in automobile purchasing will mean different
things to a consumer who prefers luxury cars than it
will to one who prefers an off-road vehicle or an
economy car. The desirable product or service as
well as the fair price is in the eye of the beholder. This
concept rings true in defining value in health care as
well. Michael Porter, a leading proponent of the
value proposition in health care, defines value as
health outcomes divided by costs. He points out that
“value should always be defined around the
customer.”4(p2477) In this vein, we would argue in
line with the classic Donabedian model, that health
care structure and process, along with outcomes,
are highly relevant considerations in the value
proposition (Table 1).5 Structure refers to the
context in which care is delivered, including facil-
ities, organizational characteristics, and, impor-
tantly for radiation oncology, equipment and
technology. Process encompasses all components
of health care delivery, including interactions be-
tween patient and physician and the technical
delivery of care. Outcomes refer to the effects of
health care on patients and include both objective
(eg, survival) and subjective outcome measures
(eg, quality of life). Intuitively, structure, process,
and outcome fundamentally affect the patient’s
experience when interfacing with the health care
system and inherently matter to an individual’s
value equation.
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CURRENT ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE AND CHALLENGES TO
ACHIEVING VALUE
Describing the Cost Conundrum
Remarkably, inability to assess cost poses the greatest challenge in
determining value in health care. Providers and administrators do not
have clarity on the various components of care that need to be mea-
sured or what the actual costs of these components are. Although
providers often know what they charge and may know many of the
individual direct costs within a radiation oncology clinic, they never-
theless are unable to calculate the total cost of a treatment adminis-
tered at the patient level. In this regard, because costs are borne by
providers and repaid by insurers and patients, providers approximate
costs by using billing charges or reimbursement, not the calculated
total cost of providing care. From a system point of view, the situation
is further complicated by the fact that charges for the same proce-
dure can vary widely among different providers. There is no good
justification beyond the notion of free market for this practice. The
inability to consistently and reproducibly measure costs is a man-
ifest impediment to overcome if we are to address the value prop-
osition in radiation oncology.
Economic Incentives, Utility, and Cost
The lack of understanding about cost and the other components
of value creates difficulties for all stakeholders in health care. For
example, the patient’s lack of clarity regarding value creates an incon-
gruity that can lead to increased cost, over- and underutilization, and
decreased quality. Economists believe that consumers are utility
maximizers—that is, they will choose to have the highest utility for the
lowest dollar. Utility is defined in economic terms as usefulness (ie,
ability of something to satisfy needs or wants). However, in health
care, there is no reliable or consistent correlation between cost and
utility. Radiation oncology clinics can be paid the same for a given
service, but without an equal outcome or quality of the service pro-
vided. At the same time, charges widely vary among cancer treatment
facilities. Medical device pricing is equally opaque; when surveyed,
most physicians cannot correctly estimate the price of medical devices
they routinely use.6,7 If this were the case for products outside of health
care, the market would naturally drive the price of the costlier item
toward that of cheaper substitutes, because consumers would not pay
a higher price for a nonsuperior product. So why does the opposite
often happen in health care? The answer lies in deficiency of informa-
tion; consumers do not know the real costs or quality offered by
different providers. Moreover, patients often assume equality in these
factors. In economics terms, there is an information asymmetry be-
tween the providers and consumers of health care.8 If patients do not
know how a provider ranks in terms of key factors that inform utility,
they cannot truly be utility maximizers. Therefore, a situation exists in
our current encounter-based, frequency-rewarding, fee-for-service
health care payment system where providers do not understand their
own true costs and cannot rationally or rigorously relate their charges
to actual cost or quality. At the same time, the patient/consumer also
lacks needed practical information to make informed decisions re-
garding purchase of health care. From a value perspective, our health
care market is remarkably inefficient, where both sides of the transac-
tion have high levels of unreliable critical information. In response,
payers have proposed and in some cases have attempted to link aspects
of payment to various quality indicators. To date, there is a dearth of
validated quality indicators that can be used as quality measures linked
to payment in radiation oncology. Those that do exist are said to not
have a demonstrable effect of lowering cost or improving quality.
Consequently, in our current circumstance, the predominant market
response of payers is to grind on unit price whenever possible. This
maneuver is performed without valid consideration of the true cost
of care or an understanding of the value to the patient or to society
of the care supplied. In some market situations, technical services
for radiation oncology are contracted at what seem to be marginal
rates, without consideration of the actual cost of delivering the care
or maintaining its quality and safety. The situation is further con-
founded in certain submarkets where issues of payer mix create
inadequate access for some patients while other patients receive
unneeded treatment.9-13
As costs continue to rise at troubling rates, patient, consumers,
payers, providers, and society are all beginning to ask: Are the costs of
medical services commensurate with the utility provided? Where do
high costs come from? A basic tenet of economics is that incentives are
major determinants of people’s behaviors and choices. Many experts
attribute high costs to misaligned incentives among the various stake-
holders in health care—that is, the goals of patients, providers, and
payers are not always aligned. Specifically, health policy analysts are
fast coming to the conclusion that the fee-for-service payment system,
which reimburses providers based on volume of service and not on
quality or value, encourages overuse and overprescription, leading to
higher overall costs.14 In addition, the simplistic payer response to the
cost spiral—that of merely lowering reimbursement for provider
services—instead results in a volume behavior effect, which further
exacerbates the situation.15 In this milieu, information asymmetries,
together with misaligned financial incentives, create the so-called
Table 1. Current Challenges to Achieving Value
Structure Process Outcomes Costs Global
System: lack of cross-specialty
integration of care
Inadequate emphasis on
accessibility, timeliness,
and coordination of care
Inadequate systems for
longitudinal discrete data
capture (eg, registries)
Not well measured for
disease process, nor for
cycles of care
Information asymmetries
between patients and
providers
Setting: lack of meaningful
practice standardization/
accreditation
Provider centered, not patient
centered
Lack of standardized instruments
for patient-reported outcomes
Financial incentives toward
overutilization
Overutilization driven by moral
hazard and provider-induced
demand
Provider: lack of meaningful
practice standardization/
certification
Insufficient evidence-based
guidelines/best practices
and lack of incentivized
adherence
Inadequate subjective and
objective outcome data for
quality assessment
Not transparent and
not commensurate with
quality
Difficulties in risk stratification
between patient groups
hinder comparison
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principal-agent problem, which may in turn lead to supplier-induced
demand. Patients (ie, principals) assume that their physicians (ie,
agents), who have more information about medical treatments, will
act in the principals’ best interest. However, when the agent has an
incentive to recommend one treatment over another, the principal-
agent problem emerges. Striking examples of supplier-induced de-
mand for radiation therapy services were recently described in a New
England Journal of Medicine article noting urologists’ increased use of
intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) in prostate cancer
when they had an economic stake in the radiation therapy treatment
equipment. The study demonstrated that when urologists had owner-
ship in radiotherapy practices in the setting of limited specialty groups
( four specialties), their patients were significantly more likely to
receive IMRT for prostate cancer as opposed to other less expensive
treatment options. This phenomenon even extended to their patients
who were age  80 years.9 The agent—in this case, a self-referring
physician—acts in his own economic best interest rather than in the
principal’s medical interest. In a similar study conducted by the US
Government Accountability Office, however, when the ownership
interest was dispersed within multispecialty groups with 20 special-
ties, the principal-agent problem notably disappeared.16
Patient Incentives to Choose High-Value Care
What incentives do patients have to choose high-value health
care? Although providers may have incentives to create supplier-
induced demand, patients have their own misaligned incentives that
prevent the attainment of value. For example, moral hazard arises
when patients who are insured by a third party (eg, employer, govern-
ment) have access to comprehensive health care plans for which they
pay only a small fraction of the total cost. Various studies have shown
that patients use more medical services when they have more generous
health plans that are less restricted or require less cost sharing.17-19 To
address moral hazard, health plans have increased cost sharing by
using copayments and higher deductibles. However, this practice
may be counterproductive in achieving value; it runs the risk of
preventing patients from pursuing necessary, high cost–sharing
medical treatments.20-22 By attempting to curb overutilization of
medical services in this way, insurers may actually be worsening
patients’ health and increasing ultimate associated costs of their
covered populations.
Special Case of the Patient With Cancer
The patient with cancer presents a special case for payment re-
form. There is a heretofore prevailing attitude that cancer is, to some
extent, a so-called sacred cow when it comes to reining in cost—even
the cost associated with futile care. One study reported that inflation-
adjusted direct medical spending on cancer care exhibited a 50%
higher growth rate compared with the rest of health care over a 20-year
period.23 Informing a particular dilemma for patients with cancer,
recent studies have highlighted the effect that out-of-pocket (OOP)
costs have on patients’ ability to access medical care and ability to pay
for other, nonmedical, life necessities.24-27 Medicare patients with
cancer pay substantially more OOP than patients without cancer, and
adjuvant radiotherapy and systemic chemotherapies contribute to the
discrepancy.28 As a partial solution to this problem, it is advocated that
clinicians have frank discussions with patients about incremental ben-
efit and the costs of prescribed treatments and procedures.22,29 To
understand why OOP costs affect patients’ access to health care, we
can look to the basic economic concept of supply and demand. The
demand for health care, as with any product, depends on five main
factors: OOP costs, income, prices of other complementary or substi-
tute goods and services, tastes or utility, and expectations. The cost of
health care, in one form or another, involves all five of the factors that
affect demand. Economists once believed the demand curve for health
care was relatively inelastic—that is, a rise in price of health care
minimally influenced the demand for health care. But this theory
probably applies only to well-insured patients. The manifest risk is that
as OOP health costs rise and incomes remain flat throughout the
country, the demand curve may begin to look more elastic—that is,
patients will demand less routine medical care and only seek medical
attention when they are exceptionally ill. Patients may also demand
less medical care as the prices of complementary goods (eg, medica-
tions) rise or price of substitutes (eg, housing, education, food) rise.
We now know that costs clearly matter to patients—even patients
with cancer. Therefore, patient understanding of the incremental ben-
efit of a particular treatment or procedure is one aspect of achieving
high value. This understanding can alter the patient demand equation,
both by decreasing the cost component and by changing patient utility
and expectations of medical care.
ACHIEVING VALUE IN RADIATION ONCOLOGY
Radiation oncology is an arcane, technology-based, tertiary specialty.
It is rooted in costly technology infrastructure that is ever evolving,
and proper treatment delivery is critically dependent on a team effort
requiring not only physicians and nurses but also specially trained
physicists, dosmetrists, and radiation therapists. As an obscure spe-
cialty, until recently, radiation oncology was rarely mentioned in dis-
cussions of health care reform. However, notable recent events have
shifted the spotlight onto the specialty. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services identified the billing code associated with IMRT as
one of the top 10 codes across all specialties contributing to Medicare
spending growth from 2004 to 2010.30 TheNewYorkTimes ran a series
of articles highlighting injuries sustained by overdoses of therapeu-
tic radiation,31-33 and numerous articles have questioned the value
of high-cost proton-beam therapy.34-36 These and other high-
profile references to radiation oncology highlighting cost and po-
tential safety concerns have incited a newfound health policy
interest in radiation oncology.
As a framework for discussing value in radiation oncology, we
will modify the Porter value equation (value  outcomes/cost) by
expanding the numerator to include structure and process along with
outcomes consistent with the Donabedian model for quality.5 Hence,
expanding the Porter equation to include structure and process essen-
tially transforms the value equation as follows: value  quality/cost
(Fig. 1).
Structure
Structural components of medical care include “the adequacy
of facilities and equipment; the qualifications of medical staff and
their organization; the administrative structure and operations of
programs and institutions providing care; fiscal organization and the
like.”5(p695) In recent years, radiation therapy has become significantly
more sophisticated, with enhanced complexity in all of its treatment
modalities, including brachytherapy, IMRT, and stereotactic radia-
tion. To address rising concerns about ensuring proper structure for
Teckie, McCloskey, and Steinberg
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the delivery of radiation oncology care, several initiatives attempting
to standardize the structural components required to advance high-
value care have emerged. In 2012, a consortium of 12 radiation oncol-
ogy societies authored “Safety Is No Accident,” which set forth specific
requirements for radiation oncology facilities with regard to structure,
personnel, and technical processes to ensure a safe environment for
the delivery of radiation therapy.37 In 2013, the American Society
for Radiation Oncology (ASTRO) put forth detailed draft standards
for practice accreditation, which included structure and a few process
elements.38 The ASTRO Accreditation Program for Excellence
(APEX) will provide third-party, impartial peer review of personnel,
equipment, treatment planning, medical records, patient-safety poli-
cies, and quality control/quality assessment activities. As with previous
radiation oncology practice accreditation programs, the draft stan-
dards stress structural elements, but an emerging new emphasis on
process should be noted. The American Society for Clinical Oncology
(ASCO) has created its own quality assessment and improvement
programs for the medical oncology community.39 In addition, ASCO
certifies oncology practices that have surpassed certain quality thresh-
olds via its Quality Certification Program, akin to the ASTRO APEX.
In theory, achieving practice accreditation would indicate a threshold
for quality and in effect impart a seal of approval for referring physi-
cians, prospective patients, peers, regulatory agencies, and payers.
However, implementation of these efforts leads to the following ques-
tion: Do these parties know or care about accreditation or what the
process certifies? Currently, payers do not mandate accreditation, nor
are there meaningful economic incentives to seek or maintain accred-
itation. Such a mandate would facilitate the setting of a quality thresh-
old and would address one of the major criticisms and detractors of
value for the specialty: widespread variation in structure not otherwise
linked to quality.
New Economic and Structural Incentives to Decrease
Cost and Improve Value
Newer coverage models that incentivize patients to choose high-
value providers by allowing a credit or discount on their copay if they
choose high-value hospitals and providers (those that report their
outcomes and costs) are emerging. Some large employers have started
to pay for employees’ elective cardiac and orthopedic surgical care,
travel, lodging, and food costs if they have their procedures performed
at what benefit managers consider to be high-value institutions. These
so-called high-value or preferred providers presumably practice using
established standards characterized by optimal patient selection, treat-
ment delivery, and outcomes. For radiation therapy, the notion of
preferred providers for certain high-stakes procedures such as
brachytherapy or stereotactic radiation could potentially encour-
age patients to select high-value providers who meet certain stan-
dards of quality and cost. Incentives would be actively aligned;
patients spend less (via premium credit or discount for OOP costs)
for consistent care, and insurers spend a predetermined amount for
selected high-value providers. Once again, with the deficit of clear
quality indicators, difficulties with risk stratification, and ongoing
inconsistency and disagreement regarding patient selection and the
process of treatment delivery, there exists a risk that lowest cost would
primarily drive the selection of providers.
A related example of a market-based pricing arrangement, di-
rected at patient health care purchasing behavior and intended to
decrease cost and improve value, is the so-called narrow or tiered
network offered by health plans. According to the health plans, narrow
provider networks are chosen based on quality and cost. However,
given the current relative absence of quality indicators in radiation
oncology, involvement by providers in these tiered networks is
typically based on price or provider relationships with a larger
market-dominant entity. Nevertheless, payment reform has caused
acceleration of these narrow network products, at times as compo-
nents of accountable care organizations (ACOs). To maximize value
and provide sustainable affordability for consumers, ACOs devise new
payment mechanisms, including performance-based contracts, bun-
dles of care and episodes of care payments, shared risk between pro-
vider and payer, and capitated payment.40,41 In some markets,
clinically integrated networks are intended to combine broad market
coverage with global risk-sharing payment methodologies to address
the cost and quality imperatives. In this regard, some have predicted
that the health care market is likely to shift from traditional open-
access preferred provider organizations to these new ACO models.
The intent of these coverage vehicles is to focus on quality and cost. It
is proposed that these new health plan offerings will be less about being
narrow networks and more about a care delivery model that provides
the highest efficiency and best value for the consumer. Although the
form and execution of these evolving concepts of payment reform are
not yet known, and their effects on radiation oncology care are uncer-
tain, they pose clear incentives to integrate episodes of cancer care
around treatment directives, clear patient-centered processes of care,
and validated outcome metrics.
In this regard, integration of medical practice across the contin-
uum of care has been identified as a high-value organizational struc-
ture for delivery of health care, particularly in the management of
complex diseases such as cancer.3 In the specific case of integrated
practice units (IPUs), teams of clinical and nonclinical personnel
provide care through the entire continuum of the disease process.2
Critical features of the IPU model include the shared development and
use of care pathways and treatment directives following evidence-
based guidelines, as well as feedback mechanisms for continual refine-
ment and improvement of care. This model also delineates utilization
of resources through each step of the process of care, with an eye
toward economic efficiency and patient convenience. Through the
IPU approach, overuse of tests and procedures is reduced. Value is not
Process
  Patient centered
  Coordinated
  Accessible
  Evidence based
Structure
  Accredited
  Integrated
  Technologically 
    current
  Safe
Costs
  Transparent
  Measured through
    full cycle of care
  Related to quality
Value
Outcomes
  Objective
  Subjective, 
    patient reported
  Publicly available
Fig 1. Key components of value.
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only achieved through cost savings enabled by this care delivery struc-
ture, but is further enhanced by the increased use of the patient-
centered shared treatment decision-making paradigm. Radiation
oncologists are aware that misleading or incorrect information deliv-
ered upstream to the patient’s radiation oncology encounter in the
traditional referral-based process of care can obfuscate the decision-
making process for the patient. The IPU model obviates that issue for
the patient, thereby further improving value.42
The concept of integration of care is not new, but until recently, it
was slow to catch on. New initiatives in integration of care, such as
medical and surgical homes as well as cross-specialty integration of
cancer care, have recently gained traction.3,41,43 Patient-centered inte-
gration of care requires reassessment of the traditional interactions
between subspecialists and ancillary staff, as well as the siloed use of
physical space. The quest for value in health reform enables new
reimbursement models that can transform the ways providers deliver
care.40 As payers and providers realize that fragmented care is ineffi-
cient, costs too much, and is not patient centric, the market is begin-
ning to appreciate value-bundled payments for entire episodes of care.
IPUs create a care delivery structure that enhances value because the
patient is followed through an entire continuum of care for a given
condition, making the measurement of all components of care possi-
ble. The IPU structure can inform the process and cost components of
value as well as create value.
Process
Process encompasses all components of health care delivery, in-
cluding interactions between patient and physician and the technical
delivery of care. Some components of process can be readily observed
and appreciated by patients, whereas others, which may be of critical
import in a technologically advanced specialty like radiation oncology,
are less readily appreciated. Patients may value care delivery in an
esthetically pleasing environment, service with a smile, shared deci-
sion making, and timely coordinated care. However, just as critical to
achieving true quality are less tangible components, including physi-
cian expertise and medical physics quality assurance oversight for
treatment planning and delivery. With regard to physician expertise,
radiation oncology has much in common with surgery. It is a locore-
gional treatment strategy, procedural in nature, reliant on technologic
advances, and ever evolving. The concept of the learning curve is well
known in the surgical literature, as is establishing proficiency
through procedure-specific training, proctoring, and outcome
review.44-50 Several studies have also highlighted the importance of
a learning curve for radiation oncology techniques, including
brachytherapy procedures, IMRT volume delineation, and techni-
cal IMRT delivery.51-54 Repeated performance of best practices and
standardization of care where possible are clearly associated with
improved outcomes in both the operating room and intensive care
unit settings.55-57
As regards radiation oncology, Radiation Therapy Oncology
Group (RTOG) cooperative group clinical trials are an example of
effective practice standardization. These trials specify treatment-
planning specifics, including contouring guidelines, dose constraints,
planning techniques, and trial compliance criteria. Centralized review
processes, including rapid review of initial protocol cases and timely
review of subsequent cases, ensure proficiency and ultimately quality.
Studies examining the impact of compliance with treatment-planning
specifics in cooperative group trials suggest that protocol deviations
are associated with inferior outcomes.54,58,59
In recent years, the emphasis of the specialty has been directed
toward defining indications for radiation therapy by the promulgation
of so-called evidence-based guidelines. Significantly less emphasis has
been placed on defining process-focused optimal treatment delivery.
As a result, there remains considerable variation in practice and a lack
of standardization of technical delivery of care. Defining excellence in
technical delivery of radiation therapy is necessary to allow for proper
assessment and accountability. The budding best practices initiative of
ASTRO, based on the RAND/University of California Los Angeles
appropriateness criteria,60 serves to address this important deficit in
refining the process of care in radiation oncology.
Outcomes
Outcomes comprise multiple measures that can be categorized
on a spectrum spanning from the finitely objective to the qualitatively
subjective. Objective outcomes are the ones that providers and payers
have customarily measured: health status, such as disease control and
survival; functional physical status and pain level; time to recovery;
disease recurrence; complications of treatment; and rate of disease
prevention. Subjective outcomes are considered by some observers to
have so-called softer end points, with methodologies for their mea-
surement that may not necessarily comport with traditionally ac-
cepted scientific methods. They are, nevertheless, of equal importance
in the value discussion. These subjective measures include patient-
reported outcomes, psychosocial ramifications of the disease or treat-
ment, ability to maintain employment status, and measurement of the
patient’s understanding of his or her medical condition. Of the pro-
posed components of value, the medical community is best at mea-
suring outcomes on the objective side of the spectrum. In this regard,
there is general agreement within the specialty of radiation oncology
that the scope and detail of its objective outcome metrics should be
Table 2. Proposed Steps for Creating Value in Radiation Oncology
Structure Process Outcomes Costs
Engage integrated practice unit
models for delivery of care
Optimize accessibility, timeliness,
and care coordination
Measure both objective and
subjective outcomes
Measure all costs involved
with providing care for
given episode of care
Promote or mandate accreditation
to reduce variation among
practices
Establish process standards that
are patient centered and safety
focused
Create easy-to-use national registries Move beyond billed charges
and know true total
cost for cycle of care
Encourage patients to select
providers who meet high-value
standards
Facilitate patient access to
information about process
aspects of their care
Report outcomes, guideline adherence,
and best practice adherence among
providers
Drive value via payment
reform strategies
Teckie, McCloskey, and Steinberg
2868 © 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology JOURNAL OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY
enhanced. However, development of desired high-quality and high-
level medical evidence is both labor-intensive and costly. In addition,
important issues such as risk stratification pose a challenge in compar-
ing outcomes between providers and various treatment modalities
and regimens. Specialty-based and cross-disciplinary integrated real-
time observational registries are emerging as a method to help
address deficits of information about treatment outcomes.61,62
Likewise, patient-reported outcomes in radiation oncology could
not only inform translational and comparative effectiveness re-
search, health care technology assessment, and quality assurance,
but may also be used as a basis to quantify value from a patient
perspective and potentially be used as an aspect of reimburse-
ment.63 With regard to the processes and outcomes of care, those
aspects of care that are apparent and matter to patients are best
measured by directly asking patients about their experience with
their health care. Radiation oncology–specific instruments for
patient-reported outcomes are currently in development.64
MOVING TOWARD A VALUE-BASED PARADIGM FOR
RADIATION ONCOLOGY CARE
Development of a value-based paradigm for radiation oncology care is
a formative process. We are at its beginning. The components of
value—structure, process, outcome, and cost—are not theoretic or
esoteric (Table 2). However, the core of this value transformation for
radiation oncology involves the arduous task of establishing and stan-
dardizing structures and processes that reduce variation in care and
ensure high quality, while simultaneously rigorously measuring pro-
cess, outcomes, and costs. In addition, the measurement of health
outcomes must now transcend current convention and address ele-
ments that matter to the patient and embrace the patient’s sense of
value. In this regard, measuring the cost of care, for a field in which
high cost is an overarching problem, is nothing short of critical. Fi-
nally, reorganizing care though patient-centered integration of prac-
tice is foundational to creating value, because it facilitates the
measurement of outcomes and cost through the entire continuum,
and it puts patients first.
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